How many pennies for your pain? Willingness to compensate as a function of expected future interaction and intentionality feedback by Desmet, PTM & Leunissen, JM
RUNNING HEAD: WILLINGNESS TO COMPENSATE  1 
 
 
 
How Many Pennies for Your Pain? Willingness to Compensate as a Function of Expected Future 
Interaction and Intentionality Feedback 
 
 
 
Please cite as: 
Desmet, P. T., & Leunissen, J. M. (2014). How many pennies for your pain? Willingness to 
compensate as a function of expected future interaction and intentionality feedback. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 43, 105-113. DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2014.05.002 
 
 
 
 
 
  
WILLINGNESS TO COMPENSATE  2 
 
Abstract 
Despite increased research efforts in the area of reconciliation and trust repair in 
economic relations, most studies depart from a victim’s perspective. Specifically, these studies 
evaluate the process of trust repair by looking at the impact of restoration tactics on victims’ 
reactions. We focused on the transgressor’s perspective and present findings from two studies 
that investigated how the amount of compensation that a transgressor is willing to pay depends 
on victims’ reactions to the transgression (i.e. whether they claim the transgression happened 
intentionally or unintentionally) and the time horizon of the relationship between the transgressor 
and the victim (future vs. no future interaction). We hypothesized and found that transgressors 
are willing to pay less compensation to a victim who believes the transgression happened 
intentionally (as opposed to unintentionally), but only so when they share no future interaction 
perspective together.  When transgressors have a future interaction perspective with the victim, 
intentionality feedback does not affect compensation size. 
Keywords: compensation; intentionality; perpetrators; transgression; reconciliation; trust repair;   
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How Many Pennies for Your Pain? Willingness to Compensate as a Function of Expected Future 
Interaction and Intentionality Feedback 
Trust is a vital facilitator of cooperation in almost any kind of social interaction we 
engage in. None of these interactions, however, being it in short- or long-term relations, are 
immune to negative incidents that can damage trust. In economic relationships too, the 
importance of trust in creating and preserving cooperative relations contrasts sharply with the 
prevalence of conflict and trust violations. Transgressions in these relations may not just erode 
trust and put that particular relation in danger, but may also affect one’s trust in other current and 
future relationships. Therefore, an important challenge lies in understanding how reconciliation 
can be fostered and trust be restored between agents in economic-based relationships. 
As most of the literature on trust so far has focused primarily on the process of building 
and maintaining trust, only little research has been conducted on the topic of reconciliation and 
trust repair (e.g. Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). Over the last years, however, scholarly interest in 
the process of trust repair increased and as a first step, studies have investigated how and when 
particular restorative tactics can be effective.  For example, research has revealed how and when 
verbal accounts, such as apologies, denials or justifications, can be an effective tool to restore 
trust (De Cremer, Pillutla & Reinders Folmer, 2011; De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Kim, Ferrin, 
Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Leunissen, De Cremer, Reinders Folmer, & Van Dijke, 2013; Schlenker, 
Pontari, & Christopher, 2001). Interestingly, studies have also revealed how in economic 
exchange relations, where economic resources are the object of interaction and a transgression 
often results in a tangible, economic loss, the provision of a financial compensation can too exert 
a positive influence on the restoration of trust and the preservation of a cooperative relation (De 
Cremer, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2010; 2011a, b; Bottom, Daniels, Gibson & 
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Murnighan, 2002; Gibson, Bottom & Murnighan, 1999). Indeed, given that transgressions in 
these relations most of the times entails a financial loss, research has shown that the mere 
provision of verbal accounts like apologies could be regarded as cheap talk and the provision of 
compensation is therefore more apt in fostering reconciliation and renewed cooperation. 
Although increased research efforts in the area of trust repair in economic relationships 
have illuminated the process of trust repair by showing when and how particular restoration 
strategies can be effective, the studies conducted so far all have in common that they tend to 
depart from a victim’s perspective. Specifically, these studies have focused on the possibility of 
trust repair by examining the impact of for instance apologies or financial compensations on 
victims’ trust intentions and behaviors. Although this is a logical starting point for investigating 
the feasibility of reconciliation in economic relations, now that we have substantial evidence that 
particular restoration strategies like financial compensations can be effective to restore trust and 
cooperation in economic relations, an important next step is to see whether and to what extent 
transgressors are actually willing to engage in using these strategies. Indeed, transgressors play a 
crucial role in deciding whether and to which extent they wish to financially compensate the 
victim of an economic transgression. We therefore argue that for a full understanding of the 
determinants of reconciliation and trust repair in economic relationships, it is not only valuable 
to know the circumstances under which different financial compensations are most effective in 
restoring trust, but it is equally imperative to investigate the circumstances under which 
transgressors decide whether to compensate and how much compensation they are willing to 
provide. 
Research on the willingness to compensate is very scarce to date. In fact, we are only 
aware of two such studies, conducted in the 1960’s (Berscheid & Walster, 1967; Berscheid, 
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Walster, & Barclay, 1969). These studies looked at whether or not transgressors were willing to 
compensate (yes/no) depending on whether their options to compensate were restricted to only 
provide partial compensation, only exact compensation or only overcompensation. The 
researchers found that perpetrators were more likely to compensate when exact equity could be 
restored, compared to when exact equity could not be restored (i.e. either under- or 
overcompensation). No research, however, has so far considered how much transgressors are 
actually willing to give in the more realistic situation in which they have no such restrictions. In 
response to the scarcity of research in this area we present findings from two studies in which we 
investigated how the victim’s reaction to the transgression (i.e. whether they claimed the 
transgression happened intentionally or unintentionally) influences the amount of compensation 
that a transgressor is willing to provide.  In this venture, we take an instrumental perspective on 
transgressors’ restoration strategies and hypothesize that whether transgressors take this feedback 
from victims into account when deciding to compensate, will depend on whether there is a future 
interaction perspective with the victim or not.  
1. Transgressors and victim feedback 
After a transgression, transgressors are often motivated to engage in reconciliatory 
behavior. It should however also be stressed that perpetrators tend to be strategic in their decision 
to undertake restorative action. Arguing that apologizing comes at a high social cost and does not 
guarantee forgiveness and a restored relationship, Leunissen, De Cremer and Reinders Folmer 
(2012), for example, hypothesized and found in an economic setting that transgressors are less 
likely to apologize if they have information that indicates that victims will most likely be 
unforgiving. Indeed, the authors found that if a victim shows that he/she is willing to forgive 
transgressors are more likely to apologize compared to an unforgiving victim. Their findings 
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therefore suggest that transgressors will be more inclined to take efforts to repair a relationship 
when it is likely that these efforts lead to forgiveness and a restored relationship.  
One of the pieces of information that may signal whether or not a victim will be inclined 
to forgive and continue to have a cooperative relationship with a transgressor constitutes 
information about whether the victim believes the transgressor committed the transgression 
intentionally or not. Prior research has repeatedly shown that one of the fundamental attributions 
that victims seek to make when treated unfairly concerns attributions about intent (Greenberg, 
1990; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 2003; Rutte & Messick, 1995). Moreover, perceptions of 
intent influence attributions of culpability and blameworthiness for transgressions, and people’s 
tendency to respond to them with forgiveness or retribution (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Fincham, 
2000; Aquino, Tripp & Bies, 2001). 
In the field of trust repair, research has revealed that whether or not victims believe a 
transgression was performed intentionally is a crucial determinant of the effectiveness of 
subsequent restoration strategies. Struthers and colleagues (2008) for example found that 
whereas for unintentional transgressions apologies may help in stimulating victim forgiveness 
they become less effective when victims attributed intent to the violation. Interestingly, and 
important to our present research question, in the context of economic exchanges, findings have 
indicated that the effectiveness of financial compensations on the victim’s responses too depends 
on the extent to which victims see the transgression as intentional or not(Desmet et al., 2011a).  
An interesting question that then arises is whether transgressors will also adapt their 
compensation strategy (i.e. the level of financial compensation they are willing to pay) 
depending on how victims think about the intentionality underlying the violation. We are not 
aware of any research that has investigated the effects of allegations of intentionality on a 
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perpetrators willingness to compensate. Nevertheless, this is arguably an important variable to 
study, as this kind of information is likely to be communicated by a victim in the wake of a 
transgression. How may this intentionality feedback than influence the willingness of a 
perpetrator to financially compensate a victim?  
When a transgressor learns that a victim believes that the transgression was committed 
intentionally, then this may first of all suggest to the transgressor that the damage to the relation 
is much more severe than when the victim still has some belief in the good intentions of the 
perpetrator. Furthermore, it may suggest that the victim will not have a strong motivation to 
forgive and restore the relationship. The important question then becomes whether the 
transgressor is willing to engage in these costly reconciliation efforts, when the risk of not being 
forgiven is relatively high and the cost of the restorative action is equally high. Indeed, financial 
compensation literally comes at a substantial cost to the transgressor. Given that the likelihood to 
be forgiven is much lower when a victim believes the transgression was intentional, an 
instrumental perspective on the willingness of transgressors to pay compensation would suggest 
that when victims think the violation occurred intentionally, perpetrators would be less inclined 
to compensate as the cost of financial compensation may be too high concerning the relatively 
low likelihood of being forgiven. Likewise, when the victim believes the violation occurred 
unintentionally, perpetrators may perceive the likelihood of a financial compensation obtaining 
its desired effect as higher, and are as such more willing to financially compensate the victim, 
compared to when the victim thinks the transgression occurred intentionally. 
2. When refusing to compensate is not an option: A future interaction perspective 
The reasoning above suggests that instrumental transgressors will be less inclined to offer 
a financial compensation when victims hold bad beliefs regarding the transgressor’s intent to 
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commit the transgression. We propose that under some circumstances, transgressors will still be 
motivated to pay financial compensation to victims, even when these victims displayed their 
belief of bad intent on behalf of the perpetrator. We argue that this will be a function of the 
structure of the relationship with the victim (i.e. whether transgressor and victim are engaged in a 
short-term or long-term relationship).  
When people are in an exchange relationship with a long-term interaction perspective, 
their behavior towards their interaction partner can be fundamentally different from when the 
relationship has a short-term perspective. Experimental findings with economic games have 
consistently shown that when people expect ongoing interaction, they behave more cooperatively 
than when they do not (Mannix, 1994; Murnighan & Roth, 1983; Shapiro, 1975). Murnighan & 
Roth (1984) for example explicitly manipulated the expected probability of future interaction and 
observed that this probability was an important determinant of cooperative behavior. This 
“shadow of the future” as coined by Axelrod (1984, p. 126) has not just been shown to foster 
cooperation in game settings, but also in organizational settings such as interactions between 
buyers and suppliers (Heide & Miner, 1992).   
Importantly, a crucial difference between having a future interaction perspective or not 
lies in the specifics of the interdependence structure of that relationship. When agents have a 
future interaction perspective, they are more dependent on the other party for their future pay-
offs and may therefore be more committed to the relationship and value the relationship more 
than when future interactions are not expected (Kelley & Thibaut, 1975; Poppo, Zhou & Ryu, 
2008). One of the results of this stronger commitment is that agents are also more likely to 
initiate reconciliation in the event of transgressions (Tomlinson, 2011; Finkel et al., 2002). 
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Perpetrators in relationships with a long future interaction perspective may therefore be more 
motivated to provide compensation to the victim as well.  
Given this stronger motive for reconciliation in relationships with a future interaction 
perspective, we hypothesize that in relationships with no future interaction perspective, 
transgressors will provide less compensation when the victim believes the transgression occurred 
intentionally, compared to when the victim believes the transgression occurred unintentionally. 
However, When a relationship has the perspective of future interaction, they will not discount 
this intentionality information in the amount of compensation they are willing to provide. This 
would mean that after a victim accuses a transgressor of intentionally transgressing, the 
transgressors should be more willing to provide a financial compensation when they have a 
future perspective with the victim, compared to when they have no future perspective with the 
victim. 
3. The present research 
Until now research has provided evidence on when financial compensations can be 
effective. However, very little is known about the willingness of transgressors to provide these 
compensations. Following an instrumental perspective, we hypothesize that transgressors will be 
less willing to pay a financial compensation when a victim holds the belief that the violation 
occurred intentionally (as opposed to unintentionally), but only so when transgressor and victim 
have no future interaction perspective together. When a transgressor has a future interaction 
perspective with the victim, a transgressor will be willing to provide the same amount of 
compensation irrespective of whether the transgression is perceived to be intentional or 
unintentional.  
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We tested these predictions in two studies, using a hypothetical transgression in an 
organizational setting in Study 1 and by means of a laboratory experiment using a modified trust 
game (Study 2) that allowed us to measure the willingness to compensate after an experimentally 
induced transgression 
4. Study 1 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants & design.  
Participants were recruited through the online recruitment system of Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
A total of 103 participants were recruited (49 women; M(age) = 35.89, SD(age) = 12.94). 
Participants were randomly assigned to our 2 (future interaction: future / no future) X 2 
(intentionality feedback: intentional / not intentional) between-subjects design. 
4.1.2 Materials.  
In the scenario presented to the participants, participants were asked to imagine they were the 
director of a company producing specialized parts for bicycles and motor bikes. Due to a 
computer system crash, their company had been unable to deliver a batch of bicycle parts to a 
customer (bicycle) company in a timely manner. Participants learned that due to this incident, the 
bicycle company had suffered an estimated financial loss of $ 50.000.  
We manipulated future concerns by adding in the no future condition the information that 
their company had recently decided to stop producing bicycle parts (and focus on making and 
selling motorcycle parts instead) and that as such this would be the last delivery of parts to this 
company. In the future condition, the relationship with this company was described as an 
ongoing interaction. Intentionality feedback was manipulated by stating that in response to the 
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late delivery, the owner of the bicycle company had contacted their firm communicating that he 
believed their company (un)intentionally did not meet the deadline. 
4.1.3 Measures.  
All measures, except for the amount of compensation, were measured on a 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much) Likert scale. We checked the effectiveness of our future interaction manipulation by 
asking participants: (1) Our company will still have contracts with the bicycle company in the 
future (2) Our company will no longer deliver bicycle parts to the bicycle assembly company in 
the future and (reverse coded; r = .71; p < .001). We checked our intentionality feedback 
manipulation by asking participants: (1) The bicycle company accuses my company of 
intentionally breaking the delivery deadline; (2) The bicycle company understands that our 
company did not intend to break the delivery deadline (reverse coded; r = .87; p < .001). The 
amount of money that participants were willing to compensate was our main dependent variable. 
Using a slider, anchored from $ 0 to $ 100.000, participants could indicate the amount they 
wanted to offer to the customer company as compensation. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Manipulation checks.  
An ANOVA with future interaction and intentionality feedback as independent variables and the 
future manipulation check scale as dependent variable indicated a significant effect of our future 
manipulation (F(1, 99) = 153.36, p < .001, η2 = .61). There was no effect of our intentionality 
feedback manipulation (p = .94), nor an interaction effect (p = .28). As expected, participants in 
the future condition anticipated more future interaction with the customer company (M = 5.56, 
SD = 1.19) than participants in the no future conditions (M = 2.21, SD = 1.51). 
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An ANOVA with future interaction and intentionality feedback as independent variables 
and the intentionality feedback manipulation check scale as dependent variable indicated a 
significant effect of intentionality feedback (F(1, 99) = 185.12, p < .001, η2 = .65) as well as an 
effect of future (F(1, 99) = 9.54, p = .003, η2 = .09). The interaction effect was not significant (p 
= .48). As expected, participants in the intentional conditions indicated they were accused of 
intentionally breaking the deadline (M = 5.52, SD = 1.45) while participants in the unintentional 
conditions indicated they were accused of unintentionally breaking the deadline (M = 1.88, SD = 
1.28). Unexpectedly, participants in the no future conditions were also more inclined to think 
that the owner of the customer company thought they did not meet the deadline more intentional 
(M = 4.25, SD = 2.30) than participants in the future conditions (M = 3.07, SD = 2.11). 
4.2.2 Amount of compensation.  
An ANOVA with future and intentionality feedback as independent variables and the amount of 
compensation as dependent variable indicated a significant interaction effect (F(1, 99) = 4.43, p 
= .04, η2 = .04). There was no main effect of intentionality feedback (p = .32), nor of future 
interaction (p = .25). 
Simple effects analyses (see Table 1 for cell means) indicated that in the no future 
interaction conditions participants were willing to offer more compensation when the owner of 
the customer company thought that not meeting the deadline was unintentional than when the 
owner of the customer company thought that not meeting the deadline was intentional, (F(1, 99) 
= 5.00, p = .03, η2 = .05). In the future interaction conditions there was no difference between 
intentional and unintentional (F(1, 99) = .58, p = .45, η2 = .006). 
Moreover, when the owner of the customer company thought that not meeting the 
deadline was intentional, participants were more willing to compensate the owner when there 
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was a future with that company compared to when there was no future (F(1, 99) = 5.24, p = .02, 
η2 = .05). When the owner of the customer company thought that not meeting the deadline was 
unintentional, participants wanted to compensate an equal amount when there was a future 
compared to when there was no future with that company (F(1, 99) = .45, p = .50, η2 = .005). 
4.3 Discussion 
The results of study 1 clearly confirmed our predictions: whereas participants were 
willing to pay significantly less compensation to a victim that believed the transgression 
happened intentionally (as opposed to unintentionally), this only appeared to be the case when 
victim and transgressor had no future interaction perspective together. In contrast, when both 
parties had a future interaction perspective, perpetrators wanted to compensate an equal amount 
when the victim thought the transgression happened intentionally or unintentionally. As such, the 
findings of Study 1 supported our hypothesis using a diverse sample and a typical transgression 
in organizational settings. 
  To strengthen the confidence in these initial findings, we decided to conduct a second 
study. In this second study, we aimed at addressing a number of issues concerning Study 1. One 
of the weaknesses of the scenario approach we employed there is that participants did not 
commit an actual transgression, but were merely asked to imagine they committed a 
transgression. Likewise, in deciding how much compensation they would offer to the victim, 
participants were not actually making decisions about their own outcomes. Therefore, in Study 2, 
we wanted to verify whether we could replicate our findings with participants that (1) actually 
committed a transgression and (2) were making decisions that affected their own outcomes. For 
this purpose, we turned to the lab and conducted a controlled laboratory experiment. 
5. Study 2 
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5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participant & design.  
A total of 197 participants (75 women; M(age) = 20.45, SD(age) = 1.80) were recruited at a major 
Dutch university. They were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of our 2 (future / no 
future) X 2 (intentional feedback / unintentional feedback) design. 
5.1.2 Procedure.  
In this study, we aimed to investigate financial compensation behavior for actual transgressions. 
In order to induce participants to commit a transgression we used a paradigm developed by 
Leunissen and colleagues (2012). This paradigm is a modification of the trust game (Berg, & 
Dickhaut, & McCabe 1995), in which participants are coaxed into committing a transgression 
against their interaction partner.  
The game was presented as a task on social decision-making. Participants were told that 
they would be playing an interaction task with another person in the lab. By means of a fixed 
lottery, all participants were assigned to role of Player 2, while the other (non-existing) 
participant was Player 1. It was explained that in the task, Player 1 had received a valuable 
endowment consisting of an undisclosed number of valuable chips. Participants were told that 
any chips transferred to them by Player 1 would be tripled, such that they would receive three 
times as many chips for each chip given by Player 1. Participants learned that they would have to 
decide how many of the tripled number of chips to return to Player 1. 
The game was modified in such a way that participants were likely to make an unfair 
decision towards Player 1 (i.e., more likely to keep more chips for themselves than to give back 
to Player 1). This was done by inducing uncertainty over Player 1’s initial endowment. It was 
explained that the initial endowment of Player 1 could be anything from 10 to 30 chips; however, 
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the exact endowment was unknown to the participant. Subsequently, the participant learned that 
Player 1 has transferred 10 chips. Because 10 chips was the lowest endowment possible, we 
expected that most participants would infer that the original endowment of Player 1 would be 
larger than 10 chips (this assumption was confirmed, see the results section). Because 
participants estimated the original endowment of Player 1 to be larger than 10 chips, Player 1’s 
contribution of 10 chips implied that he/she had chosen not to transfer all his/her chips. We 
therefore expected that participants would also feel justified to return a smaller share than 50% 
of their 30 chips. 
 After participants had made their decision on how to divide the 30 chips, we revealed 
that the initial endowment of Player 1 had in fact been only 10 chips, meaning that Player 1 
showed a high level of trust by transferring the entire endowment. This meant that participants 
who made an advantageous unequal division (138 or 70.1%) had violated the equality rule and 
acted unfairly towards Player 1. After we gave participants feedback about the final division of 
the chips, we asked a number of questions on their perceptions of the final division (see 
dependent measures section). After these questions, the experiment stopped for the participants 
who had not committed the transgression. Those participants who had committed a transgression 
proceeded towards the intentionality feedback manipulation and the subsequent dependent 
measures 
5.1.3 Future manipulation.  
Expected future interaction was manipulated by informing participants in the no future condition 
that this game was a single shot interaction. Participants in that condition were told they would 
only play one round with their interaction partner. In the future condition, it was told that this 
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was the first interaction of an indefinite number of interactions, without being specific on how 
many interactions there would be in total. 
5.1.4 Intentionality feedback manipulation.  
After participants made the first division, they received feedback on Player 1’s thoughts about 
the initial division. This feedback consisted of a screenshot of two questions that player 1 had 
answered. These two questions were: (1) “To what extent do you think Player 2 made this 
distribution intentionally?”, and (2) “Do you think it is possible that Player made this distribution 
by mistake?”. Both questions were answered on a 1 (not at all), to 7 (very much so) scale. In the 
intentional feedback condition, Player 1 answered a 6 on the first question and a 2 on the second 
question. In the unintentional feedback condition, Player 1 answered a 2 on the first question and 
a 6 on the second question. 
5.1.5 Measures.  
We checked our intentionality feedback manipulation with two items: (1) Player 1 thinks I 
intentionally created this division, and (2) Player 1 thinks I did not intend this distribution 
(recoded; r = .72, p < .001). After the transgression and the intentionality feedback manipulation, 
participants were given the opportunity provide a compensation to Player 1. Our dependent 
variable of interest was the final amount of chips that Player 1 received. 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Transgression.  
A total of 138 participants committed the transgression against Player 1 and 59 participants did 
not. Because our future manipulation was induced before participants made a decision on how 
many chips to keep and how many to return to Player 1, we checked whether our future 
manipulation had an effect on the transgression rates. A logistic regression analysis indicated that 
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participants in the no future interaction condition were not more likely to commit a transgression 
than participants in the future interaction condition (b = -.16, Wald’s χ2 = .26, p = .61, odds ratio: 
.85). 
Overall, participants estimated the original endowment of Player 1 to be 19.9 (SD = 6.41) 
chips large. Participants who committed the transgression thought the original endowment of 
Player 1 was significantly larger (M = 20.86, SD = 6.36) than participants who did not commit 
the transgression (M = 17.68, SD = 6.00; t(194) = 3.27, p = .001). As a result, participants who 
committed the transgression returned significantly less chips to player 1 (M = 17.81, SD = 4.46) 
than participants who did not commit the transgression (M = 7.31, SD = 3.76; t(195) = -16.98, p 
< .001). 
 A t-test on whether participants thought the final division was fair indicated that 
participants who had committed the transgression thought the final division was significantly less 
fair (M = 5.51, SD = 2.04) than those who did not commit a transgression (M = 3.05, SD = 1.71; 
t(195) = -8.71, p < .001). Moreover, participants who committed the transgression felt more 
guilty about the final division (M = 3.88, SD = 1.88) than participants who did not commit the 
transgression (M = 2.10, SD = 1.46; t(195) = 6.50, p < .001). 
5.2.2 Manipulation check.  
An ANOVA with the intentionality feedback manipulation and the future manipulation as the 
independent variables and our intentionality feedback manipulation check scale as the dependent 
variable indicated a main effect of our intentionality feedback manipulation (F(1, 134) = 195.24, 
p  < .001, η2 = .59). As expected, participants in the intentional feedback condition indicated that 
player 1 ascribed more intentionality to the division (M = 5.66, SD = 1.23) than participants did 
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in the unintentional feedback condition (M = 2.75, SD = 1.19). Neither the main effect of future 
interaction (p = .62), nor the interaction effect (p = .27) were significant. 
5.2.3 Compensation.  
An ANOVA with future and intentionality feedback as independent variable and the final 
amount of chips for Player 1 as the dependent variable indicated a significant interaction effect 
(F(1, 134) = 5.94, p  = .02, η2 = .04; See Table 2 for cell means). Neither the main effect of 
intentionality feedback (p = 51), nor the main effect of future was significant (p = .47). 
Simple slopes analyses indicated that when there was no future with Player 1, Player 1 
received a higher final amount of chips when Player thought it was unintentional than when 
Player 1 thought it was intentional (F(1, 134) = 4.94, p  = .03, η2 = .04). When there was a 
future, there was no difference between intentional and unintentional (F(1, 134) = 1.54, p = .22, 
η2 = .01). 
Moreover, when Player 1 thought the distribution was intentional, Player 1 received 
higher final outcomes when there was a future than when there was no future (F(1, 134) = 5.58, 
p  = .02, η2 = .04). When Player 1 thought the distribution was unintentional, Player 1 received 
equal outcomes when there was a future compared to when there was no future (F(1, 134) = 
1.33, p  = .25, η2 = .01). 
5.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 confirmed our previous findings, but now in a different, laboratory 
setting where participants actually committed a transgression. As in study 1, we observed that 
whereas participants were willing to pay significantly less compensation to a victim who 
believed the transgression happened intentionally (as opposed to unintentionally), this was only 
the case when the victim and transgressor had no future interaction perspective together. In 
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contrast, when both parties had a future interaction perspective, victims that believed the 
transgression happened intentionally were compensated just as much. 
6. General discussion 
Financial compensations have proven to be a widely used and effective response to 
distributive harm (Desmet et al., 2011a, b).  Remarkably, we know little about the willingness of 
perpetrators to provide such a financial compensation and about the factors that influence this 
willingness to compensate. Across two studies, we have shown that intentionality feedback by 
the victim and whether or not future interaction with the victim is to be expected, both influence 
this willingness. When a victim communicates that he or she perceives the violation as 
intentional, a transgressor will be inclined to pay less compensation than when the victim thinks 
it happened unintentional, but only so when transgressor and victim share no future interaction 
perspective. Taken together, our findings contribute to the literature in several ways.  
A first contribution of our findings to the study of financial compensation and trust repair 
is that we studied the transgressors’ willingness to provide them. Prior research in the area of 
trust repair has mainly evaluated the process of trust repair by focusing on the effects of this 
particular restoration strategy on victims. By showing that transgressors are both sensitive to 
victims’ reactions and relational characteristics in their decision to compensate, our study joins 
recent efforts that investigate when transgressors are actually willing to employ restoration 
strategies or not, which is an equally crucial stage in the process of trust repair (e.g. Leunissen et 
al., 2013).  
A second contribution of our studies is that we focused on financial compensations that 
transgressors are willing to pay as an outcome variable. The few studies that did investigate the 
motivation of transgressors’ to engage in restorative actions only looked at transgressors’ 
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willingness to apologize (e.g. Leunissen et al., 2012; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).  Very little 
research on trust repair has investigated the factors that influence the amount of financial 
compensation that a transgressor is willing to pay. In the context of economic exchanges, 
however, interactions consist of the exchange of resources with a tangible value and 
transgressions therefore most often imply a material loss for the victim. Prior research has shown 
that in such cases, although apologies can be effective to some extent, supplementing these with 
a financial compensation for incurred losses is a more effective road towards trust repair (Bottom 
et al., 2002; Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, De Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013). As a result, an 
equally important challenge for research on trust repair exists in uncovering the factors that 
underlie transgressors’ compensation behavior. By showing that transgressors’ willingness to 
pay is influenced by both victims’ reactions and relationship characteristics, our findings provide 
a valuable first step in this direction. 
Furthermore, although our findings show that transgressors can indeed be instrumental in 
their decision to compensate, an interesting observation was that when victims and transgressors 
would no longer interact, transgressors still paid a substantial amount of compensation to victims 
that communicated their belief about the transgressor’s good intent,. Our findings therefore also 
show that transgressors do not necessarily behave as utility-maximizing decision makers, which 
would predict that transgressors would not engage in compensation at all when there is no future 
interaction perspective with the victim (see Leunissen et al., 2012 for similar findings). 
Our findings also open some interesting avenues for future research. First of all, more 
research is needed on the transgressor’s motives for providing financial compensation to victims. 
Although we embedded our research within the existing literature on trust repair, our findings do 
not allow concluding that the compensation behavior by transgressors is in fact driven by the 
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desire to restore trust as we did not measure this trust repair motive. A desire to repair trust could 
be one of the motivators of perpetrators to provide financial compensation but there may also be 
other reasons why perpetrators may provide less compensation to victims that communicate their 
belief about bad intent. For one, perpetrators may also be less willing to compensate victims in 
basic act of reciprocity to an accusation of bad intent (i.e. reactance) which may be overruled by 
considerations of future interaction. Moreover, it would also be worthwhile to investigate to what 
extent victim feedback affects experienced guilt which may in turn explain compensation 
behavior. Future research should therefore focus on providing more insight in the motives of 
transgressors’ compensation behavior by investigating underlying mechanisms. 
Second, given that our focus in these experiments was on the willingness to compensate, 
one of the intriguing areas for further research lies in investigating when perpetrators are more 
willing to either offer compensation or verbal accounts (like denials, excuses or apologies) or 
provide both in combination. Findings have indicated that even in the case of distributive harm, 
providing apologies in combination apologies can sometimes foster more reconciliation than the 
provision of compensation alone (Haesevoets et al., 2013; Okimoto & Tyler, 2007). Given that 
compensation and apologies are both costly but may entail different social costs, it may be 
interesting to unveil how the willingness of perpetrators to engage in either or both of these 
restoration strategies may differ along characteristics of the relationship, the violation or the 
transgressor.  
Finally, by taking a transgressor’s perspective, our findings also open the possibility for 
researchers to study when reconciliation is likely to happen (or not) by running double-sided 
studies with subjects in both roles (victims and transgressors), while allowing mechanisms of 
communication and compensation between victims and transgressors. These studies can provide 
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an interesting starting point to investigate when a transgressors’ willingness to engage in 
restorative actions coincides or conflicts with victims’ actual need for these actions. Putting our 
findings that in short-term relations transgressors will be willing to pay less compensation when 
victims view the transgression as intentional side by side with previous findings that intentional 
violations can make financial compensation less effective (Desmet et al., 2011a), suggests 
therefore that in such situations reconciliation is unlikely to happen as both parties will be less 
inclined to show goodwill towards each other.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1. 
Means (SD) for compensation amount, and in Z scores, in Study 1 
 intentional unintentional 
Future 
30.696 (21.606) 
.24 (1.06) 
26.337 (18.390) 
.03 (.90) 
No future 
17.732 (17.890) 
-.39 (.88) 
30.094 (22.700) 
.21 (1.11) 
 
 
Table 2. 
Means (SD) for final amount of chips for the victim (Player 1) in Study 2 
 intentional unintentional 
Future 14.62 (4.91) 13.13 (4.76) 
No future 11.97 (5.93) 14.56 (3.28) 
 
